CHAPTER 5

Exporting Aotearoa
New Zealand’s Biculturalism:
Lessons for Indigenous-Settler Relations
in Canada

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Introduction

Canada is currently undergoing a process of reconciliation between indigenous peoples (First Nations, Metis and Inuit) and settler populations. Aotearoa New Zealand is arguably ahead of Canada in terms of its bicultural relationships between Pākehā and Māori (or even the more inclusive tangata tiriti and tangata whenua). Since its creation in 1840, New Zealand has exported many things aside from wool, dairy products and world-class rugby. One salient export has been ideational — a unique idea of biculturalism between Indigenous peoples and European settlers. Ideas, as the Clark Labour government noted a decade ago, are very important to how New Zealand is seen in the world, and the idea of exporting “knowledge and value” was attractive then, as it is now (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002, p. 32). While biculturalism was at first far more myth than reality, providing an “illusion of superiority” amongst British settler states, there are many aspects of NZ biculturalism that can act as

In essence our exports need to reduce in weight and become heavier in knowledge and value. To achieve this we need a vibrant and well integrated innovation system which is capable of creating wealth from ideas. (Clarke, 2002, p. 32)
benchmarks for helping settler Canadians articulate how reconciliation might work in practice (Murphy, 2009, p. 64).

Canada has traditionally excluded Indigenous peoples from both how the country is governed and represented to its own people and the outside world. This chapter explores some of the positive aspects of the New Zealand bicultural model and contrasts this with Canada’s English–French biculturalism and its multiculturalism of diverse ethnic communities, both of which suppress the Indigenous origins of what is now Canada. This country has recently undergone some interesting changes, which make this chapter timely. In October 2015, the long-serving Conservative government of Stephen Harper was defeated by the Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau, the young and charismatic son of one of Canada’s best-known former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. By December of that year, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) wrapped up its six-year mandate. Earlier that year, they issued 94 recommendations for fundamentally changing the relationship between the settler population and Indigenous peoples.

The purpose of the TRC has been to come to terms with the intergenerational legacies of Indian Residential Schools. This system was operated by the federal government and the four main Christian churches; some 150,000 Indigenous children were forced over a period of 150 years to attend a network of 125 schools located across the country. They were stripped of their cultures, languages and traditions, in what the TRC has called “cultural genocide”. Verbal, physical and sexual abuse ran rampant through the schools. The schools created high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and other serious problems that have passed and continue to pass inter-generationally. At least 6000 children died there. An estimated 80,000 residential school survivors are alive today (MacDonald, 2015, pp. 413–414).

As Canada goes through a process of reconciliation, many aspects of New Zealand biculturalism appear attractive. However, there are obvious differences between the two countries which make lessons difficult to apply. First, New Zealand was colonised much later than North America, New Zealand has only one Treaty, and one fairly culturally and linguistically cohesive Indigenous population, concentrated within a geographic area the size of the British Isles. From 1902, Māori had forms of political representation in settler institutions (although their population warranted far higher representation). Christian conversion for Māori was widespread and seemed to synthesise better with
Māori value systems than it did for many First Nations, in part perhaps because Māori leaders managed to create syncretic forms of religion, such as the Ratana Church and political movement. Māori were not forced to attend residential schools, although the integrated schooling system was designed to assimilate and indoctrinate just as day schools were in Canada. Māori were similarly not as geographically isolated and maintained a larger population base relative to settlers relative to Indigenous peoples in Canada. This made a difference in terms of visibility and political power, which while relatively weak in a Pākehā-dominated society was nevertheless stronger than any comparable situation in Canada. Ranginui Walker notes his people’s “success in maintaining cultural continuity in the face of tremendous assimilative pressures” (Walker, 1987, p. 96).

Despite these positive developments, many point (quite rightly) to the low economic status of Māori relative to Pākehā populations, in part a result of successive neoliberal policies from the 1980s onwards. While symbolically Māori are in a relatively stronger position than they were historically, their social and economic indicators have fallen considerably since the free market reforms, Māori unemployment has risen significantly, as well as the percentage of Māori living below the poverty line. Similarly, access to housing has plummeted. An exception is the iwi-based Māori elites who have profited somewhat by the Treaty settlement process. However, these people make up only a small fraction of the Māori population (Rashbrooke, 2013, p. 27). The percentage of prisoners who are Māori has also increased since the 1980s; currently, 52 per cent of male prisoners are Māori, alongside a staggering 63 per cent of women. This marks a shocking change from the 1988 report on Māori and the criminal justice system (Jackson, 2014).

New Zealand thus offers a model but also a cautionary warning. First, symbolic recognition of Māori, official bilingualism, the spread of Te Reo in schools and the rapid pace of treaty settlements would indicate that Māori are doing better than before. However, the pace of economic reforms has created much higher levels of economic inequality for Māori than before the “Māori renaissance” of the 1980s.

What then can Canada learn from the New Zealand experience? This chapter explores several themes: Indigenous-settler biculturalism, the relational concept of Pākehā, electoral change through mixed member proportional (MMP) representation and Indigenous conceptions of interdependence with the natural world.
Biculturalism

One of the most striking aspects of New Zealand society for outsiders is Indigenous settler biculturalism. Many social scientists suggest that until the 1970s, biculturalism was primarily rhetorical, used to disguise Pākehā monocultural hegemony (see Maaka and Fleras, 2005, p. 98). De facto forms of bi-nationalism grew out of Māori protest during the 1960s and 1970s, and the idea of a Māori–Pākehā partnership developed through such signposts as the 1975 Waitangi Tribunal; Te Reo Māori as an official language (by 1987); the creation of Māori educational systems and the widespread introduction of Māori names for institutions, Māori culture and Māori rituals. Overall, the relationship was reframed during this period as one between tangata whenua (people of the land) and the tangata tiriti (settlers represented by the Treaty of Waitangi) (Poata-Smith, 2013).

Biculturalism as it has evolved has consisted of various policies designed to implement an ethos of sharing power, at least symbolically between the two founding peoples of the state. Mason Durie outlined two broad themes — one giving recognition to the cultural traditions of Māori and Pākehā, the other favouring a redistribution of resources to Māori (Durie, 1998, p. 101). Ranginui Walker promoted the idea of transforming all monocultural institutions into bicultural ones. As such:

biculturalism is the coexistence of two distinct cultures, Māori and Pākehā, within New Zealand society with the values and traditions of both cultures reflected in society’s customs, laws, practices and institutional arrangements, and with both cultures sharing control over resources and decision making. (Durie, 1998, p. 101)

Biculturalism can also lead to calls for institutionalised bi-nationalism, which, as Fleras and Maaka observe, implies a reworking of dominant institutions and narratives, privileging both narratives and practical realities of a “majority-to-majority partnership”, shared sovereignty and “complementary co-existence”, where respect for difference is embedded into the way the state is structured (Maaka and Fleras, 2005, pp. 275–76). Related aspects could include a Māori justice system, something Moana Jackson and others have been promoting in their work, given the deplorable prison statistics that echo similar problems in Canada. Others such as Whatarangi Winiata have sought parallel political institutions for Māori at the national level, with legislative branches for Pākehā and Māori based on separate governance traditions (Hayward, 2015).
Canada has little experience of biculturalism or bi-nationalism with Indigenous peoples in the sense that both our biculturalism and multiculturalism exclude Indigenous peoples. Although Canada is consistently rated as one of the top countries in the UN Human Development Index, Indigenous peoples rank alongside citizens of Panama, Belarus and Malaysia in terms of their social and economic prospects, and these gaps are not narrowing (Daschuk, 2013, p. 9). Bilingualism/biculturalism between the descendants of British and French settlers is ostensibly a consociational arrangement between two colonizing powers — a battle over who shall play the host and where. Commissioner Wilson of the TRC has put it that “both English and French have been used as weapons to destroy indigenous languages and cultures” (Wilson, 2012).

Multiculturalism, perceived as tolerance for ethnic communities who are neither British nor French, likewise excludes Indigenous peoples. The largesse of Euro-Canadian society as host to non-white newcomers is a prominent part of this process. Efforts to include Indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities within a multicultural paradigm are sometimes undertaken as a means of deliberately downplaying their sui generis rights and the treaty relationships they maintain with the crown (MacDonald, 2014).

The tendency to lump Indigenous peoples together as one or possibly three groups out of a multitude of ethnic minorities has worked to dilute and suppress Indigenous rights and occlude the reality of their distinctiveness, which is culturally diverse as Europe. Voyageur and Cailliou have noted the wide range of genographical, legal, social, cultural and linguistic differences between Indigenous peoples, with 633 Indian bands, some 20,000 reserves, 11 language families, and 53 languages (Voyageur and Calliou, 2000/2001, p. 103).

We see the marginalization of Indigenous people demonstrated in a variety of ways, what we might call examples of a sort of Foucauldian micropolitics of settler colonialism. For example, in Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s publication Discover Canada, we see a settler state largely devoid of Indigenous presence, a country composed of immigrants with some groups more important than others. Indeed, Indigenous peoples are presented as the nation’s first immigrants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 10). However, “Canadian society today stems largely from the English-speaking and French-speaking Christian civilizations that were brought here from Europe by settlers.
English and French define the reality of day-to-day life for most people and are the country’s official languages” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 12).

What elements and symbols comprise the nation? First we have the British monarch and English law, “an 800-year old tradition of ordered liberty, which dates back to the signing of Magna Carta in 1215 …” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 8). Followed by this are the “Canadian Crown”, then the Canadian flag which in part comes from the “the flag of the Royal Military College, Kingston”, and its colours coming from the “colours of France and England since the Middle Ages”. The maple leaf was “adopted as a symbol by French Canadians in the 1700s”. The fleur-de-lys “was adopted by the French king in the year 496”. The Canadian coat of arms, “contain symbols of England, France, Scotland and Ireland as well as red maple leaves”. Finally, the two official languages are “important symbols of identity”. The guide concludes: “English speakers (Anglophones) and French speakers (Francophones) have lived together in partnership and creative tension for more than 300 years” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, pp. 38–39).

The guide demonstrates rather well the sort of studied exclusion we as a state promote when welcoming newcomers to Canada, and also epitomises the larger problems of strategic forgetting at the centre of the settler colonial project. The professed symbols of Canada are all tied to either one or both of Canada’s founding European peoples, or to choices made by European settlers (such as the maple leaf). This guide illustrates well how successful the settler colonial project has been in Canada. We do not need to acknowledge Indigenous peoples as part of the integration process, and the guide confirms that a relationship with Indigenous peoples is not necessary as part of being Canadian.

Another illustration of the same type of alienation is Rudyard Griffith’s 2008 book 101 Things Canadians Should Know About Canada. Sponsored by the federal government and the Dominion Institute (also known for their glorification of John A. MacDonald), not one of the 101 “things” pertain to Indigenous peoples or their contributions. This project, initiated by a right-wing institute tied with a conservative government, was based on an online survey of over 3000 adult respondents throughout the country as to the seminal events and people in Canadian history. Respondents included “522 educators who deal with subject areas related to social sciences, history, geography, civics,
music, art or culture, as well as 274 members of the Order of Canada". Of interest is that Indigenous leaders, events, places and symbols are notably absent (Dominion Institute and Angus Reid Polling, 2008). Ultimately, this glaring omission was identified and Indigenous peoples were tacked on as the 102nd spot on the list (Canadian Press, 2008). Again this particular issue says a great deal about the importance accorded to Indigenous peoples when even the educated public has a chance to voice their opinions.

These examples illustrate well what Marie Battiste has called “cognitive imperialism”, to describe how Indigenous peoples have been obliged to internalise the worldviews of the “dominant society” (Rice and Snyder, 2008, p. 55).

In a recent reflection on what it means to be a white settler, Fitzmaurice observes that to be white in Canada is to be, at a macro/structural level, free of colonial/racial encumbrances; it is also to be the source of the downward push on all other non-whites. It is to be perceived as “normal” and unmarked, always transforming oneself within a sea of others’ conspicuous, fixed differences. (Fitzmaurice, 2010, p. 354)

In the New Zealand context, the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils embraces what they call a “Treaty-based multicultural society in which Māori have particular status as Tangata Whenua” (New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils, 2015). The Treaty and its obligations are central to this vision of what New Zealand should look like in the future. The annual meeting I attended in Gisborne in 2013 was on a Marae and featured Māori Party president Naida Glavish as the keynote, speaking on Manaakitanga or Māori hospitality. The idea of promoting a strong biculturalism first, followed by multiculturalism is indeed the reverse of what we have done in Canada, with highly negative effects for Indigenous peoples. This squares well with Ranginui Walker’s view that the Treaty was the first immigration agreement between Māori and representatives of the settlers, and heralds an actual period of legal and political relationships, with negotiated forms of governance for each group (Spoonley and Bedford, 2012, p. 230).

One way in which the idea of indigenous settler biculturalism is being mooted is through the idea of all Canadians being treaty people, a sort of echo of the tangata whenua — tangata tiriti division. The TRC stresses that “We are all Treaty people who share responsibility for taking action on reconciliation” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a, p. 12). In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, the idea of everyone being a treaty person has
become more popular as educational kits are prepared for use in school classrooms. Currently, Saskatchewan and Manitoba have Indigenous demographics of about 15 to 17 per cent of the population, which is roughly comparable to New Zealand; which is perhaps why things are possibly changing at the provincial levels (Friesen, 2016).

Pākehā Identity

An aspect of identifying as a treaty person is reflected in another innovation unique to New Zealand — the concept of Pākehā, about which I have undertaken a detailed study (MacDonald, 2016). These terms go back to the 19th century at least in common usage as Salmond recalls (Salmond, 1997, p. 279). As with Māori, Pākehā was a culturally heterogeneous category, as Belich (2002) and others have observed. It began largely as a description of non-Māori Europeans, but has evolved since the 1970s to refer to an aspirational identity based on a relationship with Indigenous peoples. Liu and Ward observe “Perhaps as many as a quarter of New Zealanders of European descent self-identify as Pākehā, which is a self-designation that acknowledges a relationship with Māori as a part of one’s own group identity” (Ward and Liu, 2012, p. 21). Here the process of reconciliation between settlers and indigenous peoples has involved political, economic, cultural and ideational power-sharing, which have come about through a Māori renaissance and the development of economically powerful iwi (tribal entities) through the treaty settlement process.

David Pearson has viewed the Pākehā self-description as “an explicitly nationalist endeavour to create a postcolonial identity that fully acknowledges the bicultural, possibly binational, foundations of the settler state” (Pearson, 2009, p. 49). Avril Bell’s definition takes things a step further, in that Pākehā can embody a form of self-criticism, the ability to highlight white privilege. Thus Pākehā is the majority culture, the “White, ‘political descendants’ of the group who colonized Aotearoa [and who] inherit the political (and material and symbolic) privileges ‘secured’ by the practices of colonization . . . . In this sense, all White New Zealanders inherit a colonial relationality to Māori” (Bell, 2004, p. 17).

There is an emancipatory potential embodied in Pākehā in that as Bell argues, “displaces white New Zealanders from their position of discursive exnomination as the (normal, ordinary) New Zealanders”. In other words
“Pākehā identity recognises and names white New Zealanders as one group among many who co-exist in the New Zealander nation-state. Discursively, this goes some way towards undermining white hegemony” (Bell, 1996, pp. 153–154).

In Canada, there is no shorthand term to denote a European settler Canadian in a relationship with Indigenous peoples, except perhaps “settler ally”, which is primarily an aspirational category that remains marginal and contested. The idea of having a settler identity contingent on honouring treaty and other commitments to Indigenous peoples is compelling, which can and should form an important part of the reconciliation process going forward. Ironically, terms for white people such as the Anishnaabe term shabganash is, as Fitzmaurice explains, “someone who does not understand the Aboriginal perspective of the world and fully believes him/herself to be superior to, and to know what is best for, Aboriginal people” (Fitzmaurice, 2010, p. 355). This type of a Pākehā-like relational identity could help Canadian settlers better reflect on the centrality of their relationship to Indigenous peoples.

Mixed Member Proportional
MMP representation, which has been in New Zealand since 1993 and is based on the German electoral system, has allowed for a stronger representation of Māori in the centralised institutions of government (Grey and Fitzsimons, 2012). The New Zealand experience shows that MMP and coalition governments can produce better descriptive representation for Māori, with possibly better substantive representation as well at the national level, although not at the local council levels of course, where there are serious problems of under-representation. On the positive side, the Māori Party was able to get New Zealand to sign on to the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People (UNDRIP), which had a strong influence on Canada’s participation (Watkins, 2010). Ministers of Māori Affairs have been Māori, unlike Canada where no minister of Indian affairs or Indigenous affairs has been Indigenous.

New Zealand’s bi-national model is not perfect, and academics and activists have criticised its application in practice, especially when Māori are treated as a “junior partner” in the relationship. Some point to the legal challenges between Māori and the Crown (Durie, 1998), while others note how traditional Māori governance structures have been altered to accommodate European political practices, privileging iwi over hapū and whanau.
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Some present settler colonialism as an “ongoing project” (Smith, 2012).

On the positive side, Māori have achieved parliamentary representation higher than their percentage of the overall population, alongside prominent Māori in cabinet and in other positions of leadership. Further, recent studies demonstrate that Māori and Pākehā under a bi-national system are equally committed to common New Zealand symbols and national culture, a unique situation relative to other western settler societies (Sibley and Liu, 2007). Additionally, there are Māori-based parties in parliament: the Māori Party in alliance with the National government, which also has several Māori cabinet ministers. The co-leader of the Green Party is Māori, as is the leader of New Zealand First. In the latest elections in late 2014, 21 per cent of the composition of parliament is Māori (Parliament of New Zealand, 2014). In the 2017 elections, Māori representation dipped somewhat. The Māori Party disappeared from Parliament, and Mana did not gain any seats, either as a party or in Hone Harawira’s former constituency. Prominent Māori politician Metiria Turei resigned as co-leader of the Green Party during the election cycle. Other changes included Labour gaining control of the seven Māori seats, and Winston Peters, the leader of New Zealand First holding a decisive block of seats which could hypothetically have allowed either National or Labour to govern with his party’s support. A number of its MPs, including Winston Peters, Shane Jones, Fletcher Tabuteau, and Ron Mark, are Māori.

In Canada, the electoral systems both provincially and federally are first past the post, which means that Indigenous interests are rarely represented. In the previous Parliament, there were only 7 Indigenous MPs, which increased to 10 in the October elections last year. Of the eight Liberal Indigenous MPs election, two became cabinet ministers, including our new Attorney General (Fontaine, 2015). This marks a change, albeit a minor one. In the entire history of Parliament prior to 2015, we have had 33 Indigenous MPs. The majority have been Metis (16). The first First Nations MP (that is an MP with Indian status) was elected in 1968, making him the first of 11 First Nations MPs in the history of Parliament. There have also been five Inuit MPs since 1867 (“Inuit, Métis or First Nation Origin”, 2015).

Things are changing in the sense that Indigenous voters are now being encouraged to vote tactically. The Assembly of First Nations in 2015 identified 51 key swing ridings where Indigenous voters could tip the balance in favour of...
parties promoting treaty implementation and federal investment in education, training and better housing. This sort of tactical voting signals the beginning of what could be a major change in how Indigenous peoples in Canada are understanding and articulating their interests (Kirkup, 2015).

The larger question is whether Indigenous peoples want to engage with settler state institutions. Low voter turnout stems in part from a sense that the treaties confer the right to have self-government, not dilution and submergence within the institutions of the colonisers. There is thus the sense that to participate in the settler voting process is to legitimate a system, which has no capacity to actually bring meaningful and positive change. There has been extensive discussion about reforming the electoral system — both the Liberals and the New Democratic Party (NDP) pledged to do so. However, after a rather half-hearted and poorly executed consultation process, Prime Minister Trudeau reneged on his promise in 2017, stating that the first past the post system would remain.

**Interdependence**

Recent treaty settlements in New Zealand have also embedded Māori views of the environment in some dimensions of national life. The ideal of reconciliation is one of binational co-governance structures, where various institutions share power, both political and ideational. Power-sharing consists of dividing up tasks where each group has some level of expertise. For example, the Whanganui iwi act as guardians of the Whanganui River and speak in its interests, as this is something Pākehā are less able to do. This would be an example of restoring hostness, of returning mana to an iwi that was stolen during colonization. The deep interdependence of the Whanganui iwi with the river is recognised in the 2014 Treaty settlement, which restores the Māori role as guardian of the river. As the settlement outlines: “The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable interconnection with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and wellbeing” (Te Awa Tupua, 2014).

The result is a form of co-management where the river is seen to “own itself” in the words of the Minister of Treaty Settlements. Whanganui iwi and the national and regional governments would then work towards administering the river in the best interests of the river, which is perceived to have its own interests and to also be the ancestor of the Whanganui (Stowell, 2014).
Nothing of the kind exists in Canada officially, although Indigenous leaders have been promoting forms of interdependence and respect of the earth for many centuries. For example, in The Sacred Tree, a team of authors including Elders outline a holistic vision of humanity and the natural world. A key aspect of Indigenous thought is the centrality of “wholeness”, the recognition that “All things are interrelated. Everything in the universe is part of a single whole. Everything is connected in some way to everything else” (Lane et al. 2004, p. 26). This connectedness obliges us to take responsibility for our actions, and to realise that nothing we do happens in isolation. McGaa (Oglala Sioux) puts it that “The hard part of what it means to be interrelated to all things is that our neglect comes back full circle to affect us as negatively as it affects other species. Our existence is being threatened too. We are held accountable for our actions (or lack thereof) towards the Earth, even to generations unborn” (McGaa, 2004, p. 243).

For the TRC, respect for the environment has been a key aspect of overcoming some of the legacies of colonization. As the Commissioners have stressed:

Reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, from an Aboriginal perspective, also requires reconciliation with the natural world. If human beings resolve problems between themselves but continue to destroy the natural world, then reconciliation remains incomplete. ...Reconciliation will never occur unless we are also reconciled with the earth. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a, p. 18)

If this aspect of reconciliation squares with indigenous laws, another aspect of the recommendations, we may see changes similar to those here. Of course I am aware that the river settlement is but one aspect of a much larger settlement process.

**Conclusion**

For many outside observers, New Zealand demonstrates that increased control by Māori over Māori education, law, health care and governance makes an important difference in generating positive outcomes. A mixture of recognition and control over things Māori has been very important.

In Canada, the 94 recommendations of the TRC released last year provide a solid road map on the way to a respectful and mutually beneficial partnership
ethos. Biculturalism in New Zealand has helped set a precedent for what many Indigenous leaders envisage arising from the reconciliation process. A few of their recommendations are the following:

- Increased Indigenous language recognition and rights, but even this falls short of asking for official language status as in New Zealand.
- Recommendations for the “recognition and implementation of Aboriginal justice systems” and a systematised effort to reduce structure racism and overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in prisons and other aspects of the justice system.
- Recommendation for a “Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation”, which would “reaffirm the nation-to-nation relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown”, repudiating the Doctrine of Discovery, as well as “Renew or establish Treaty relationships based on principles of mutual recognition, mutual respect, and shared responsibility for maintaining those relationships into the future. Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and legal orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including the recognition and integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements”.
  (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015b, pp. 4–5.)

Both Canada and New Zealand have many challenges regarding issues of race relations and Indigenous-settler relations. New Zealand has a growing gap between rich and poor which continues to impose severe impediments for Māori, leading to economic, political, and social marginalization; structural racism, particularly in the judicial system, remains of serious concern. However, the situation in Canada is far more serious in many respects, not only in terms of social indicators, but also as I have discussed here, in terms of ideational power, in terms of how the state is presented and understood. Models of English-French biculturalism and multiculturalism both elide the *sui generis* legal rights of Indigenous peoples and their unique and central role in the history of what is now Canada. There is certainly hope for the future, and Indigenous peoples and settler Canadians have worked to change the federal government, replacing it with something more progressive and more likely to promote the sort of reforms that will put Canada on a road to reconciliation.
References


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